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ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE (U)  
1963  
(RCS CSHIS-6(R2))

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
OPERATIONS DIVISION  
1963

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Chapter 3

Berlin Events (U)

15. <sup>u</sup>(S) Highlights

<sup>u</sup>(S) The Allied position in West Berlin was not basically threatened during 1963, but the Soviet Union continued its habitual probing for "soft spots." Soviet attempts to gain minute advantages or to uncover Allied intentions, especially on the access routes to the city, became quickly matters of top-level importance. In October and November, for instance, the Soviets stalled two U.S. convoys for more than two days each at the Autobahn check points between Berlin and West Germany. Both of these incidents escalated to serious proportions and focused world attention on Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>u</sup>(S) Earlier, Berlin's significance was accentuated by visits from the leaders of the West and East. Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev journeyed to the east sector in January for the East German Communist Party congress and then, two days after President Kennedy's triumphant visit to West Berlin in June, hastened back to "his sector." While these visits only reemphasized the status quo, they also made it obvious why situations that formerly had been handled solely by the military authorities in Germany were referred to Washington and Moscow for

<sup>1</sup>(1) Cable EOJC-J-18455, USCINCEUR to JCS, 19 Oct 63. (2) Cables USAB-1329 and USAB-522, USCOB/CG USAB to USCINCEUR et al., 5 and 6 Nov 63 All SECRET. Op-3. (3) Cable 861, Secy State to US EIM LIVE OAK et al., 7 Nov 63. CONF. Op-4.

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decisions and actions.<sup>2</sup>

(C) But the U.S. Army's mission in Berlin remained no less significant. In 1963 USAREUR and its subordinate local command, the U.S. Army, Berlin (USAB), effectively counteracted Soviet stratagems designed to weaken the Allied position in the divided city. The U.S. garrison in Berlin--reorganized, reequipped, and reduced by 900 men in September--continued to maintain the readiness posture of former years.<sup>3</sup>

(U) On 2 January Maj. Gen. James H. Polk succeeded Maj. Gen. Albert Watson II as the U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB), and as USAB's commanding general.<sup>4</sup>

16. (S) The Autobahn Crises

a. (S) The October Incident. On the morning of 10 October, during an exchange of U.S. augmentation units in Berlin, Soviet authorities at the Autobahn check point at Marienborn (see Reference Map) detained two U.S. convoys, one moving eastward to Berlin and the other on its way to West Germany, because the convoy commanders would not dismount their troops for a headcount. The U.S. commanders were following USAREUR instructions, issued in 1962, which directed that, if a convoy carried no more than 30 passengers, its personnel would not dismount.<sup>5</sup>

Similar detentions had occurred earlier in the year: in May and

<sup>2</sup>(1) Cable USAEU-457, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Jun 63. UNCLAS. (2) Cable ECJBA-11557, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 29 Jun 63. CONF. Op-4. (3) Cable EC-45114, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 1 Jul 63. UNCLAS.

<sup>3</sup>USAB Qtrly Hist Sum, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 63, pp. 1 - 3. SECRET (info used CONF. Op-4).

<sup>4</sup>USAB GO 1, 2 Jan 63. UNCLAS.

<sup>5</sup>"Passengers" meant persons riding in the rear of a truck and did not include drivers or assistance drivers. Convoys carrying 30 passengers or fewer were referred to as "non-dismount convoys"; those carrying more were designated "dismount convoys"; and those carrying no passengers were called "administrative movements." CONF. Op-4.

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June several non-dismount convoys had been delayed for as much as two hours, but in all cases the Soviets had finally dropped their dismounting demands and the convoys had been allowed to proceed.<sup>6</sup>

On 10 October, however, the two convoys were held. A third scheduled U.S. convoy, in the dismount category, arrived at Marienborn from Berlin about noon. Rather than present this third unit for clearance, USAREUR directed that it stop behind the detained west-bound trucks and await further developments.

The detentions were protested at the check point and at the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) headquarters, but as the afternoon passed the situation remained unchanged. The Soviet check point officer offered compromises--troops would be required to dismount only from vehicles carrying five or more personnel, and later, only the troops in 24-ton trucks would have to dismount--but he refused to clear the convoys unless the compromises were accepted. The U.S. officer in charge categorically refused each of the proposals. Finally, just after 1600 hours USAREUR directed that the dismount convoy proceed to West Germany. While the other two convoys waited at the check point, the Soviets cleared this unit without comment.

After government and Allied concurrence had been obtained, General Polk was authorized at early evening to implement the "Allied Rules of Conduct for Convoy Commanders," the plan prepared for such emergencies.<sup>7</sup> At 2000 hours the GSFG headquarters was informed that, if the convoys were not cleared within 90 minutes, they would proceed without clearance. Ten minutes later, however, Washington officials directed that the 1 1/2-hour ultimatum be extended to 2345 hours.

The Soviets posted an armed guard in front of one of the U.S. convoys and moved trucks in front of the other. At 2320 hours several U.S. trucks were pulled out of the convoy lines to block civilian traffic from the check point area; at 2330 the Soviets pulled a truck across all three west-bound lanes of the Autobahn, and East German workers placed spiked boards in front of both U.S. convoys.

Then, five minutes before the deadline expired, the Soviet duty

<sup>6</sup> For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Sum, 1962, pp. 17 - 26; and The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945 - 1961, Hq USAREUR, 1963, pp. 120 - 22. Both TS. NOFORN (info used SECRET. Op-1).

<sup>7</sup> For details of this plan, see USAREUR Ann Hist Sum, 1962, pp. 23 - 24. TS. NOFORN (info used SECRET. Op-1).

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officer declared that, if the U.S. vehicles that were blocking the Autobahn were pulled back into line, he would clear the convoy without any dismounting. The U.S. commander agreed, and shortly after midnight the convoys cleared the check point.

u The apparent U.S. victory proved to be meaningless. Three hours and 41 minutes after the Berlin-bound convoy had cleared the check point at Marienborn, it encountered the same Soviet dismounting demand just outside Berlin at Babelsberg. Again U.S. protests were dispatched and again the Soviets stated flatly that the troops would have to dismount.

y At 0615 hours on 11 October a U.S. dismount convoy arrived from West Berlin at the Babelsberg check point. Its troops dismounted, and the convoy cleared and proceeded westward. At 0826 a second dismount convoy, carrying an infantry rifle company, also cleared normally but halted at the check point to support the detained convoy.

u As the morning passed, the Soviet check point officer threatened that, if the detained convoy's troops did not dismount by 1045 hours, the Autobahn to Berlin would be completely blocked. At the expiration of this ultimatum the troops had not dismounted, and the U.S. representative at the check point announced that, if the convoy was not cleared within another hour, it would proceed anyway.

u Soviet armored personnel carriers moved in front of the detained convoy, and the other convoy waiting nearby was boxed in by Soviet and East German vehicles. Soviet machine guns were uncovered and loaded. As the deadline expired, the U.S. commander raised the Soviet check point barrier, and the U.S. trucks moved to a direct confrontation with the Soviet armored carriers. This time, the Soviets did not budge.

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At 1140 hours the next morning the Soviets again began to offer compromises, but each offer was refused. At 1150 the Soviet check point officer stated that he was "tired of playing games" and would conduct the headcount with all troops mounted, and at 1246 the detained convoy cleared the check point. It had spent 52 hours on the 110-mile Autobahn trip from Helmstedt to Berlin.

The dismount convoy that had cleared the check point two days before and had waited in place proceeded to West Germany without incident. The dismount convoy dispatched by order of General McConnell also encountered no difficulties.

<sup>9</sup>(1) Cable USAB-531, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 14 Oct 63. Gp-3.  
(2) Cable SHLO-5-00169, LIVE OAK to USCINCEUR, 16 Oct 63. (3) Cable ECJJC-J-18455, 19 Oct 63, cited above. Gp-3. All SECRET.

<sup>10</sup>(1) Cable JCS-3013, JCS to USCINCEUR, 11 Oct 63. Gp-4. (2) Cable ECJJC-17999, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR and USCOB/CG USAB, 12 Oct 63. Gp-3. Both SECRET.

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<sup>11</sup>(1) Cable ECJBA-17980, USCINCEUR to JCS, 11 Oct 63. (2) Cable 481, Secy State to AMEMB, Bonn, for LIVE OAK, 15 Oct 63. Both SECRET. Op-4.

<sup>12</sup>(1) Cable 1311, AMEMB, Bonn, to Secy State, 11-Oct 63. (2) Cable 458, USSEER to Secy State, 12 Oct 63. Both SECRET. Op-3.

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<sup>13</sup>(1) Cable 502, USHER to Secy State, 16 Oct 63. Op-3. (2) Cable ASECS/516/63, ASB to LIVE OAK and Allied Embs, Bonn, 17 Oct 63. Both SECRET.

<sup>14</sup>(1) Cable USAB-533, USCOB/CO USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Oct 63. Op-4. (2) Cable 1456, Amb McGhee to Secy State, 21 Oct 63. (3) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 22 Oct 63, subj: Autobahn Procedures. AEAGC-CO. Both Op-3. (4) Cable ECJC-J-18823, USCINCEUR to JCS, 25 Oct 63. Op-4. All SECRET.

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f. <sup>3</sup>(S) Informing the Soviets. Also on 28 October, the Ambassadorial Group agreed that the portion on dismounting procedures would be transmitted to the Soviets. On the following day, therefore, the three Allied commanders in chief in Germany sent identical notes explaining the procedures on dismounting, as described above, to the respective Soviet military liaison missions and to the Soviet duty officer at Marienborn.<sup>16</sup>

g. <sup>4</sup>(S) The November Incident.

Thus on the morning of 4 November a 13-vehicle, 20-passenger U.S. convoy arrived at the Marienborn check point. The Soviets promptly demanded that the troops dismount.

At 2200 hours that evening, after protests at the check point, in Washington, and in Moscow brought no results, the Soviet check point

<sup>15</sup>(1) Cable WAGTO-21, Secy State to AMEMB, Bonn, 28 Oct 63. (2) Cable SX-7139, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB/CG USAB et al., 31 Oct 63. Both SECRET. Op-3.

<sup>16</sup>Cable SX-7132, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army and USACOMZEUR, 31 Oct 63. SECRET. Op-4.

<sup>17</sup>Cable 513, USEER to AMEMB, Bonn, 30 Oct 63. SECRET. Op-3.

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officer was told that the convoy would proceed at midnight with or without Soviet clearance. As the U.S. ultimatum expired, the convoy moved forward but was blocked by Soviet armored carriers.

On 5 November the Soviets offered compromise solutions but refused to clear the convoy. Meanwhile, the U.S. 2d Armored Division, engaged in Exercise BIG LIFT, had been authorized to stay in Europe until the impasse was settled.

- That evening the British and French Commandants each dispatched a non-dismount convoy from Berlin. When the Soviet demands that passengers dismount were refused, the convoys cleared Babelsberg quickly without dismounting.

As the French convoy arrived at Marienborn at 2136 hours, the Soviets suddenly stated they were ready to clear the detained U.S. convoy. The U.S. officer in charge declared, however, that the Soviet armored carriers blocking the convoy would first have to be removed from the area. Both the French and British convoys cleared the Marienborn check point without difficulties, but the Soviets refused to move their armored carriers from the path of the U.S. convoy. The U.S. officer maintained his position, however, and at 0151 hours on 6 November the Soviet carriers were pulled away. The U.S. convoy was cleared and encountered no difficulties at the Babelsberg check point a few hours later.<sup>18</sup>

h. <sup>4</sup> ~~(c)~~ The Soviet Position. On 16 November GSGF headquarters informed USAREUR that, regardless of the "internal" U.S. procedures transmitted on 29 October, Soviet military authorities would continue to exercise control of persons and cargo through the Autobahn check points. Procedures set by practice could not be changed simply by announcing new ones. The established procedures involved advance notice of five or more vehicles and dismounting when there were more than "two or three" passengers per vehicle. Troops traveling in single vehicles or buses would not have to dismount and, with the permission of the Soviet commander, dismounting would not be necessary in bad weather.

<sup>18</sup> Cables USAB-1329 and USAB-522, 5 and 6 Nov 63, cited above. Both SECRET. Op-3.

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1. (S) Soviet Motives. The incident in early November clearly represented a high-level Soviet political decision to contest the Allied position on dismounting procedures. The virtual absence of precautionary troop concentrations, however, suggested that the Soviets were not ready to escalate the issue beyond the level of a local incident. Soviet shifting from one compromise solution to another during the detention period--dismount from certain vehicles, lower tailgates, either dismount or lower tailgates, move passengers to the rear of the trucks--suggested that their objective was not to establish any specific procedures. Thus, U.S. officials generally agreed that the Soviets sought merely to demonstrate that they, themselves, would determine the procedures and that the Allies remained vulnerable to harassment at any Soviet whim. 20

J. (S) Impact on Planning.

19 (1) Cable SX-7530, CINCSAREUR to USCINCEUR and DIA OOTG, 16 Nov 63. (2) Cable 1742, AMEMB, Moscow, to Secy State, 21 Nov 63. Both CONF. Gp-3.

20 (1) Cable USAB-1336, USCOB/CG USAB to USCINCEUR et al., 4 Nov 63. (2) Cable IO/COB-561-63, USCOB/CG USAB to AMEMB, Bonn et al., 7 Nov 63. Both SECRET. Gp-3. (3) Cir 861, Secy State to US ELM LIVE OAK et al., 7 Nov 63. CONF. Gp-4.

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Like USCINCEUR, General Freeman felt that during future incidents of a similar nature prompt high-level diplomatic action should be taken to impress upon the Soviets the seriousness of their actions. <sup>22</sup> 4

k. <sup>18</sup> Normalcy. After the early November incident, Soviet authorities mentioned dismounting on occasion but made no more demands, and during the remainder of the month several Allied non-dismount convoys traveled the Autobahn without incident. Anxious to return to normalcy, General Freeman suggested that the scheduling and conduct of convoy traffic be returned to General Polk as his normal responsibility. USCINCEUR agreed and General Polk, viewing convoy categories and

<sup>21</sup> Cable ECJC-J-19745, USCINCEUR to JCS, 8 Nov 63. SECRET. Gp-4.

<sup>22</sup> Cable SX-7563, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 18 Nov 63. SECRET. Gp-4.

<sup>23</sup> (1) Cable SHLO-5-00229, LIVE OAK to WAG et al., 9 Nov 63.

(2) Cable USAB-1348, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR and AMEMB, Bonn, 10 Nov 63. Gp-3. Both SECRET.

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frequency in terms of operational requirements, did not schedule troop convoys in December.

17. <sup>4</sup>(S) Other Access Problems

a. <sup>5</sup>(S) Air Access.

(1) <sup>4</sup>(S) The Private Plane Incident. (C) On 2 April the Soviet controller at the Berlin Air Safety Center declared that a private British plane, then enroute from Stuttgart to Berlin, had no legal right to enter the Berlin air corridors, and that, if it did so, the craft would be considered an air space violator. Before the plane reached Berlin safely, its pilot, Canadian entertainer Hughie Green, reported that Soviet jet fighters had fired at the craft several times.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup>(1) Cable SX-7472, CINCPACAF to USCINCPAC, 14 Nov 63. (2) Cable ECJC-J-00105, USCINCPAC to AMEMB, Bonn, 15 Nov 63. (3) Cable USAB-1765, USOCB/CG USAB to CINCPACAF, 18 Nov 63. (4) Cable ECJC-J-01008, USCINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 3 Dec 63. All SECRET. Op-4.

<sup>25</sup>(1) Cable IO/COB-112-63, USOCB/CG USAB to USCINCPAC and CINCPACAF, 2 Apr 63. Op-4. (2) Cable UNN, USERP to Secy State, 3 Apr 63. Op-3. Both CONF.

<sup>26</sup>(1) Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to Secy State, 3 Apr 63. (2) Cable UNN, USERP to Secy State, 4 Apr 63. Both SECRET. Op-3.

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(2) <sup>4</sup> ~~(3)~~ U.S. Helicopters Over East Berlin. (S) The legality of U.S. helicopter flights over the Soviet sector had been an issue of long standing; the Soviets charging violations of East German air space and the United States maintaining that there were no flight limitations within the Berlin Control Zone, which included all territory within a 20-mile radius of the Allied Control Council building.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>6</sup> ~~(3)~~ Despite low-level Soviet protests following each flight, nine flights were made over East Berlin during 1963. MIG trainers circled the U.S. helicopters during the April and June flights.<sup>29</sup> 4

<sup>3</sup> ~~(3)~~ The only instance of unusual Soviet reaction to helicopter flights occurred during the convoy detentions in early October. After protesting U.S. reconnaissance flights over the Babelsberg Autobahn check point, where a U.S. convoy was being detained, the Soviets moved two antiaircraft guns into the area, but made no attempt to use them.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> (1) Cable UNN, USSEK to Secy State, 5 Apr 63. SECRET. (2) Cable UNN, same to same, 6 Apr 63. Both Op-3. (3) Cable UNN, same to same, 27 Apr 63. Op-4. Both CONF.

<sup>28</sup> USAREUR Ann Hist Sum, 1962, pp. 28 - 30. TS. NOFORN (info used SECRET. Op-1).

<sup>29</sup> USAB Ann Hist Sum, 1963, p. 25. SECRET. NOFORN (info used CONF. Op-3).

<sup>30</sup> (1) Cable UNN, USSEK to AMEMB, Bonn, 4 May 63. (2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 16 May 63, subj: Helicopter Flights Over East Berlin. AEAGC-CO. Both SECRET. Op-4.

<sup>31</sup> Cable USAB-531, 14 Oct 63, cited above. SECRET. Op-3.

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 b. (S) The Train Guard Issue. (C) On 12 February a U.S. train commander, dismounting to check some attached freight cars at Marienborn, was threatened at gun point by a Soviet guard at the rail check point. Subsequently, the Soviets insisted that U.S. personnel were not to dismount from trains stopped at Marienborn, that the check point was on their territory, and that Soviet, not American, soldiers would guard the trains. In contrast, the U.S. position was that the train commander was responsible for the security of his train and that the long-established method of carrying out this responsibility by dismounting would not be changed.<sup>32</sup>

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 (S) As usual, the Soviets proceeded to test the U.S. position. On 12 March the check point officer threatened to detain a U.S. freight until the military policemen, who had dismounted to guard it, remounted. The guards did not remount, and the Soviet threat did not materialize. Later the same day, however, another U.S. train was delayed for forty-one minutes over the same question.<sup>33</sup>

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 (S) Since there was no reason for yielding to the Soviets on this issue, CINCUSAREUR decided to protest immediately to his Soviet counterpart if another train was delayed for more than an hour. If it was still not cleared after the protest had been delivered, consideration would be given to executing USAREUR Operations Plan AE 250-5, which provided for the evacuation of U.S. trains from the Soviet zone.<sup>34</sup>

4  
 (S) When U.S. guards dismounted from a U.S. Army freight train on 25 March, the Soviets again threatened to hold the train until they remounted. After a discussion, the U.S. train commander agreed to order the guards to remount when all documents had been processed. This was done and the train departed a few minutes later. There were no further incidents until December, when U.S. train commanders and Soviet officers at the Marienborn check point exchanged verbal protests on two occasions. The issue involved the right of U.S. military police personnel to open the door of rail cars in order to observe the entire length of the train while it stopped at the check point. No formal protest was submitted by the

<sup>32</sup> (1) Cable IO/COB -063-63, USCOB/CG USAB to AMEMB, Bonn, et al., 12 Feb 63. Gp-4. (2) Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to USERB and Secy State, 13 Feb 63. (3) Cable IO-COB-063-63, USCOB/CG USAB to AMEMB, Bonn, et al., 14 Feb 63. Gp-3. (4) Cable A-633, USERB to Dept State, 16 Feb 63. ALL CONF.

<sup>33</sup> Cable USAB-324, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Mar 63. CONF. Gp-4.

<sup>34</sup> (1) Cable SX-2421, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 13 Mar 63. Gp-4. (2) Cable SX-2595, same to same, 20 Mar 63. Gp-3. Both SECRET.

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Soviets.<sup>35</sup>

c. (S) East German Restrictions. (C) In June the so-called German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) initiated a series of restrictive measures obviously calculated to assert its sovereignty not only in East Germany but also in Berlin. On 13 June the East Germans opened a new crossing point on the Waltersdorfer highway leading from the U.S. sector in West Berlin to Schoenefeld airport in East Germany, but restricted the use of the crossing to persons traveling to and from the airport. A week later they established around West Berlin a "barred zone" of 30 to 500 yards, to which entrance was allegedly prohibited, even to Allied military personnel.

On 1 July a G.D.R. law went into effect requiring all Berlin ship owners, including West Berliners, to obtain Berlin waterways operators' licenses from the G.D.R.;<sup>36</sup> and another new decree, effective 2 July, allowed the East German authorities to establish restricted areas on land, in territorial waters, over traffic routes, in inland waters, and in the air.<sup>37</sup> Since the Soviet Union was the only recognized authority in the Soviet Zone, U.S. officials felt that the G.D.R. moves should be countered. Allied agreement on countermeasures, however, was difficult to obtain, mainly because of the British reluctance to force any issue that might hinder the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> (1) Cables UNN, USEER to AMEMB, Bonn, 26 and 27 Mar 63. Both CONF. Op-4. (2) Cable USAEU-1883, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Apr 63. FOVO. (3) USAB Ann Hist Sum, 1963, p. 21. SECRET. NOFORN (info used CONF. Op-4).

<sup>36</sup> Since 1945 the locks on all West Berlin waterways had been communist-controlled. UNCLAS.

<sup>37</sup> DE, USAREUR DCSOPS to Cofs, 13 Jul 63, subj: Background Information for CINC's Visit to Berlin, 16 - 17 July 1963. ARAGC-X. TS (info used CONF. Op-4).

<sup>38</sup> Cable ECJBA-11763, USCINCEUR to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 3 Jul 63. SECRET. Op-4.

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(S) The barred zone around West Berlin was protested to Moscow on 5 July, but a study of probing the area to determine whether the Allies actually would be prohibited entrance was finally dropped, because no agreement could be reached on an appropriate response if access was denied.<sup>40</sup>

(S) Also, the East German construction of barriers, especially on the Autobahn just outside West Berlin, continued during the year. After two East German families, riding in an armor-reinforced bus, had crashed through the existing Autobahn barriers to West Berlin in late December 1962, the East Germans began building a series of new barriers between the Soviet check point at Babelsberg and the entrance to West Berlin. By fall, concrete block walls restricted traffic to a single lane and forced it to flow in a long "S" pattern. Double-apron wire fences enclosed the flow of traffic within a giant cage, and slide barriers, drop barriers, and spiked obstacles were installed so that the route could be blocked easily at any time. Moreover, the East German border guard company assigned to the area established machine gun positions and installed point-to-point communications.

(S) The effectiveness of all these and other restrictions was shown by the reduction in escapes of East German refugees. From 2,160 in 1962, the number of escapees into West Berlin dropped to 943 in 1963. Also, there was a drop of more than 25 percent in the number of uniformed

<sup>39</sup> (1) Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to Secy State, 2 and 11 Jul 63. Both SECRET. (2) Cable UNN, USEUR to Secy State, 9 Jul 63. All Op-3. (3) Intvw, Sp4 D.J. Hickman, USAEUR 9th Mil Hist Det, with Maj G.E. Morse, USAEUR Ops Div CO Sec, 18 Dec 63. Op-4. Both CONF.

<sup>40</sup> (1) DE, USAEUR DCSOPS to CofS, 13 Jul 63, cited above. TS (info used CONF). (2) Significant Actions Rept, same to same, 28 Jul 63, subj: Sector/sector and Sector/zonal Restricted Area. ABAGC-X. SECRET. Both Op-4.

<sup>41</sup> (1) Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to Secy State, 3 Jul 63. Op-4. (2) Cable UNN, Secy State to AMEMB, Bonn, 4 Jul 63. (3) Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to Secy State and AMEMB, Moscow, 5 Jul 63. (4) Cable UNN, USEUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 16 Jul 63. All Op-3. (5) Cables, UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to Secy State, 8 Jul and 26 Jul 63. Both Op-4. All CONF.

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defectors.<sup>42</sup>

d. <sup>4</sup>(~~2~~) The Steinstuecken Incidents. <sup>6</sup>(C) A series of incidents occurred in September and October at the Steinstuecken exclave. On several occasions East German guards molested the 3-man U.S. military police patrol stationed there by throwing rocks and blinding the men with spot lights. In one instance an East German soldier, riding in an armored car, loaded and pointed a machinegun at the patrol.

<sup>4</sup>(~~2~~) On 15 September the U.S. soldiers retaliated with tear gas and smoke grenades. When another attack occurred on 30 September, General Polk ordered two helicopters and a squad of seven military policemen to fly into the exclave.<sup>43</sup> Although no further incidents occurred that night or the next, on 2 October the East German guards tossed two more rocks at the U.S. patrol, who again defended themselves with smoke grenades.

<sup>4</sup>(~~2~~) On 3 October a strong verbal protest was made to the Soviet protocol officer at Spandau Prison. Early that evening seventeen armed combat-ready U.S. Infantrymen landed at the exclave, made reconnaissance, bivouacked, and established posts generally in the locations of previous incidents. No further incidents occurred and the infantrymen were withdrawn on 6 October. Five refugees were evacuated from Steinstuecken by helicopter during the second half of 1963.<sup>44</sup>

e. <sup>4</sup>(~~2~~) Soviet Outlets Within West Berlin. (C) In late June the Soviets submitted to the West Berlin Senat an application for the reconstruction of a building they had owned since 1923 at Lietzenburgerstrasse 11 in the British Sector. After being refurbished, the 6-story building would house all Soviet outlets--trade, travel, and news media--functioning in West Berlin.

<sup>42</sup>USAB Ann Hist Sum, 1963, pp. 16 and 31. SECRET. NOFORN (info used CONF. Gp-3).

<sup>43</sup>(1) Cable UNN, USBER to Secy State, 13 Sep 63. (2) Cable IO/COB-322-63, USCOB/CG USAB to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 30 Sep 63. Both CONF. Gp-4. (3) USAB Qtrly Hist Sum, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 63, pp. 15 - 16. SECRET (info used CONF. Gp-4).

<sup>44</sup>(1) Cable IO/COB-325-63, USCOB/CG USAB to AMEMB, Bonn, et al., 3 Oct 63. CONF. (2) Cable USAB-1295, USCOB/CG USAB to USCINCEUR, 3 Oct 63. SECRET. (3) Cable ECJBA-17444, USCINCEUR to Std Berlin SITREP Adrs, 8 Oct 63. CONF. All Gp-4. (4) USAB Ann Hist Sum, 1963, p. 36. SECRET. NOFORN (info used CONF. Gp-3).

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<sup>45</sup>(1) - Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to Dept State and USEER, 30 Jun 63. SECRET.. Op-3. (2) IF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 13 Jul 63, cited above. TS (info used CONF, Op-4). (3) Cable SX-5057, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 15 Jul 63. SECRET.. Op-3.

<sup>46</sup>Cables UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to Secy State and USEER, 17 and 25 Jul 63. Both SECRET. Op-3.

<sup>47</sup>(1) Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn to Secy State and USEER, 19 Aug 63. (2) Cable UNN, USEER to AMEMB, Bonn, 22 Aug 63. Both CONF. (3) Significant Actions Sum, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 24 Aug 63, subj: Lietzenburgerstrasse Building. ARACC-X. SECRET (info used CONF). All Op-4.

<sup>48</sup>Cable 338, USEER to AMEMB, Bonn, 30 Sep 63. CONF. Op-4.

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requirements would be permitted, thus precluding further Soviet plans.<sup>49</sup>

18. (S) The Reorganization and Augmentation of the Berlin Brigade

(S) USAREUR's original proposal to reorganize the Berlin Brigade had envisaged a conversion to ROAD and an authorization by the Department of the Army for 400 additional spaces that would obviate the need for a rotational augmentation unit.<sup>50</sup>

(S) Assuming that the augmentation battle group would be withdrawn and that the additional spaces would be granted, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USCINCEUR, proposed in January the following organizational structure: a brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions of four rifle companies each, one augmented tank company, one 105-mm self-propelled howitzer battery, and one combat engineer company. In addition to the 3,651 spaces required to fill these units, 1,008 would be needed for the necessary support units, making a total permanent space requirement of 4,659--393 more than the end of FY 1963 Berlin Brigade authorization.<sup>51</sup>

(S) General Freeman preferred to use a Seventh Army infantry battalion as the augmentation unit, thereby guaranteeing the orientation of the relieving troops. He felt that the units from U.S.-based divisions should be used only for testing rapid deployment procedures and for

<sup>49</sup> Intvw, Sp4 Hickman with Maj Morse, 17 Dec 63, cited above. CONF. Op-4.

<sup>50</sup> For background information, see USAREUR Ann Hist Sum: 1962, pp. 30 - 32. TS (info used SECRET. Op-1).

<sup>51</sup> Cable ECJCO-00742, USCINCEUR to DA, 14 Jan 63. SECRET. Op-4.

<sup>52</sup> (1) TT-4618, DA and CINCUSAREUR, 4 Mar 63. Op-3. (2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 9 Mar 63, subj: Significant Actions Repts.. ABAQG-X. Op-4. Both SECRET.

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field-exercising USAREUR's prepositioned equipment.53

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<sup>4</sup>  
(16) USAREUR's final directive provided that the Berlin Brigade would be converted during September and that in early October a Seventh Army mechanized battalion, less mechanization, would replace the LONG THRUST augmentation battle group. All tactical units in Berlin would be reorganized under standard ROAD TOE's. However, because of their unusual responsibilities, the brigade headquarters and certain support units would retain their table of distribution organization. The latest model tanks and armored personnel carriers would be issued, and each infantry battalion would have eight additional armored carriers so that it could transport at least one rifle company. The reorganization would have to be accomplished, however, with no increase in space authorizations.

<sup>4</sup>  
(18) Seventh Army would organize and train the ROAD howitzer battery in West Germany before reorganization and would be prepared to rotate the augmentation battalion in Berlin at 90-day intervals. USACOMZEUR would deliver ROAD equipment and supplies to Berlin before September.55

53 (1) Cable ECJ00-04276, USCINCEUR to DA, 7 Mar 63. (2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to Cofs, 9 Mar 63, cited above. (3) Intvw, Sp4 Hickman with Lt Col J.H. Hoffman, USAREUR Ops Div O&T Sec, 15 Apr 63. All SECRET. Op-4.

54 (1) Cable JCS-9931, JCS to USCINCEUR and CINOSTRIKE, 17 May 63. (2) Cable ECJ00-9758, USCINCEUR to CINUSAREUR, 31 May 63. (3) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to Cofs, 12 Jun 63, subj: SHAPEX Briefing. ARAGC-X. All SECRET. Op-4.

55 (1) Cables SX-4443 and SX-4526, CINUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 14 and 18 Jun 63. (2) Cable USAB-1211, USCOB/CG USAB to CINUSAREUR, 21 Jun 63. (3) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to Cofs, 2 Jul 63, subj: Berlin ROAD Reorganization. ARAGC-TO. Op-3. (4) Cable SX-4846, CINUSAREUR to USCINCEUR et al., 3 Jul 63. All SECRET. All but (3) Op-4.

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(87) The forthcoming reorganization and the new augmentation plan were explained to the French and British Commandants on 8 August and to the press on the following day. Strength figures were released and it was explained that the loss of "approximately 600" personnel would be offset by the issuance of more and better weapons and by greater responsiveness and flexibility.<sup>56</sup>

(88) During September the two British battle groups were reorganized into three ROAD infantry battalions. By the end of the month the entire reorganization was completed, all necessary equipment and supplies were either on hand or on requisition, all units were near full strength, and all MOS vacancies were filled.<sup>57</sup>

(89) Beginning on 7 October an infantry battalion of the 24th Division (Mech) moved to Berlin to replace the departing LONG THRUST battle group. Certain items of heavy equipment, which would be pre-positioned in Berlin for use by subsequent augmentation units, and the newly organized ROAD artillery battery accompanied the battalion to Berlin. Actual strength of the garrison, including the augmentation battalion, was 4,887, as compared to 5,797 before the reorganization and 4,065 before the construction of the Wall in August 1961.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>56</sup>Cable UNN, USEER to Secy State, 11 Aug 63. UNCLAS.

<sup>57</sup>(1) USAREUR GO's 232 and 250, 26 Aug and 13 Sep 63. Both UNCLAS.  
(2) Cable SX-6372, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 23 Sep 63. CONF. Op-4.

<sup>58</sup>(1) Cable SX-5941, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, 30 Aug 63. CONF.  
(2) USAB Qtrly Hist Sum, 1 Jul - 30 Sep 63, p. 3. SECRET. (info used CONF).  
(3) Intvw, Sp4 Hickman with Capt R. Segal, USAREUR Ops Div CO Sec, 17 Dec 63. CONF. All Op-4. (4) USAB Ann Hist Sum, p. 44. SECRET (info used CONF. Op-4).

<sup>59</sup>Cable SHLO-5-003, LIVE OAK to MOD, France et al., 3 Jan 63.  
SECRET. Op-1.

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c. (8) Plans to Aid Wounded Refugees. (C) On 25 January the Allied ambulance, which had been stationed in Berlin at Check Point Charlie since shortly after the Peter Fechter incident of August 1962, <sup>67</sup> was withdrawn permanently. The ambulance's main purpose had been fulfilled inasmuch as the East Berlin authorities were rendering immediate medical aid to persons who had been wounded while trying to escape to the West. <sup>68</sup>

<sup>65</sup> (1) NORTHAG Ops Instr 9, June 1963. (2) Ltr, LANDCENT to distr, 2 Jul 63, subj: Berlin Contingency Planning. Both in USAREUR Ops Div CO Sec files. Both COSMIC TS.

<sup>66</sup> Ltr, USAREUR to distr, 4 Dec 63, subj: USAREUR Plan for Support to NORTHAG JUNE BALL/BERCON CHARLIE ONE (Short Title: USAREUR OPLAN AE 250-7). AEAGC-CO. TS. Op-4.

<sup>67</sup> See USAREUR Ann Hist Sum, 1962, pp. 33 - 37. TS. NOFORN (info used CONF. Op-1).

<sup>68</sup> (1) Cable IO/COB-046-63, USCOB/CG USAB to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR, 25 Jan 63. CONF. Op-4. (2) Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed), 26 Jan 63, p. 1. UNCLAS.

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(8) Upon removal of the ambulance, USCOB developed a substitute plan to aid persons who had been wounded while attempting to escape and then left unattended inside the Soviet sector. An American sedan and medical personnel were standing by at one of the U.S. compounds, and routine staff patrols were provided with first aid supplies. Upon arriving at the scene of a shooting, the patrol would present a multi-lingual card informing the Soviets or East Germans that the wounded person would be given first aid and then removed to a hospital in East Berlin. In addition, an emergency ambulance could be dispatched from the U.S. Army hospital to evacuate persons injured too seriously to be moved by sedan. Since it was unlikely that the ambulance would be allowed to enter East Berlin, it would be used only under the most unusual circumstances.

69 (1) Cable USAB-1026, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Jan 63. CONF. Op-4. (2) Cables 824 and UNN, USEUR to Secy State, 24 and 28 Jan 63. Both SECRET.

70 Cable SHLO-000146, LIVE OAK to USCOB/CG USAB and UKCOB, 29 Dec 62. TS. Op-1.

71 (1) Cable USAB-278, USCOB/CG USAB to LIVE OAK, 2 Jan 63. Op-4. (2) Cable ECCES-01229, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jan 63. Op-1. Both TS. (3) Cable UNN, Secy State to USEUR, 4 Feb 63. (4) Intvw, Sp4 Hickman with Lt Col M.M. Berry, C/USAREUR Sig Div Plns and Org Br, 25 Apr 63. Op-1. Both SECRET.

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e. <sup>C</sup><sub>(S)</sub> Communications Between USCOB and Soviet Headquarters.

(1) <sup>C</sup><sub>(S)</sub> Attempts to Establish a Channel. (S) Since the abolition of the Soviet Kommandatura in East Berlin in 1962, <sup>75</sup> there had been no direct channel of contact between USCOB and Soviet

- <sup>72</sup>(1) Cable ALO-30, USNMR, SHAPE to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Jan 63.  
(2) Cable SX-1521, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 28 Jan 63. Both TS. Gp-1.

<sup>73</sup>(1) Cable SX-1521, 28 Jan 63, cited above. (2) Cable ECCEO-012141, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 2 Feb 63. Both TS. Gp-1. -

<sup>74</sup>Intvw, Sp4 Hickman with Maj L. Tate, USAREUR Sig Div Tng and Ops Sec, 17 Dec 63. TS. Gp-1.

<sup>75</sup>USAREUR Ann Hist Sum, 1962, pp. 15 - 17. TS. NOFORN (info used SECRET. Gp-4).

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headquarters. USCOB's attempts to deal with GSFG headquarters had been unsuccessful, and matters that should have been handled in Berlin had been raised to the commander-in-chief level. The position of the U.S. Commandant has thus been degraded.<sup>76</sup>

(6) On the basis of this statement, when the remains of two Soviet soldiers from World War II were discovered in the U.S. Sector in early April, General Polk again wrote to the Soviet chief of staff, using the same channel for transmission. The letter was accepted without question,<sup>78</sup> but a few days later the chief of the SERB--not the GSFG chief of staff--replied. General Polk felt that this action was both discourteous and degrading and informed the Soviet chief of staff in late April that he still awaited a reply to the original letter. The Soviets evidently chose not to pursue the subject further, and since General Polk saw no advantage in accommodating them on their terms, the matter was dropped.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Cable UNN, USEER to AMEMB, Bonn, and CINCUSAREUR, 15 Feb 63.  
CONF.

- <sup>77</sup> (1) Cable UNN, AMEMB, Bonn, to USCINCEUR, 21 Mar 63. CONF. Gp-4.  
(2) Cable ECJBA-5267, USCINCEUR to JCS et al., 22 Mar 63. SECRET. Gp-1.  
(3) Cable SX-2681, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 23 Mar 63. CONF. Gp-3.

- <sup>78</sup> (1) Cable USAB-358, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Apr 65.  
(2) Cable UNN, USEER to AMEMB, Bonn, 13 Apr 63. Both CONF. Gp-4.

<sup>79</sup> (1) Cables USAB-369 and USAB-376, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR and AMEMB, Bonn, 22 and 29 Apr 63. Both Gp-3. (2) Cable USAB-384, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 11 May 63. (3) Intvw, Sp4 Hickman with Maj J.D. Henderson, USAREUR Intel Div Gen Coll Sec, 31 Jul 63. Both Gp-4. All CONF.

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(2) (S) Emergency Contact. Even though there was no established channel of contact, General Polk felt that in certain grave circumstances he might have to contact the Soviets immediately. In February therefore, he requested authority to use the USMLM as a means of forwarding communications, without prior approval of USAREUR. The matter of direct and immediate contact might become vital during a sudden crisis when a delay before acting might endanger the U.S. position, or when communications might have failed between Berlin and Heidelberg. Moreover, General Polk felt that he should have the flexibility appropriate to a senior commander, and thus should not have to contact USAREUR on routine matters that had previously been taken up with the Soviet Commandant.<sup>80</sup>

General Freeman decided that USCOB should have the emergency authority he had requested. Due to the special situation existing in Berlin, however, he would have to obtain USAREUR approval to contact the Soviets in all other cases. In early May, USCOB was informed accordingly.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>80</sup> (1) Cable USAB-503, USCOB/CG USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Feb 63. CONF. Op-4. --(2) Cable SX-2729, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB/CG USAB, 27 Mar 63. (3) Cable SX-3314, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 24 Apr 63. Both SECRET. Op-3.

<sup>81</sup> Cable SX-3745, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB/CG USAB, 10 May 63. SECRET. Op-3.

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(U) By the end of the year almost a million permits for trips into the Soviet sector had been issued. Special openings were made in the Wall and existing crossings were expanded to accommodate the increased traffic. In the eyes of the West Berliners, the holiday season was marred only by the Christmas Day killing of a young East Berliner who was shot while he tried to climb over the Wall. The agreement was criticized by West German newspapers and Western politicians, however, for its "technical" deficiencies, and above all, for the de facto

<sup>82</sup> Cables 761 and 787, USERR to Secy State, 6 and 12 Dec 63. Both CONF. Gp-3.

<sup>83</sup> Cable 787, 12 Dec 63, cited above. CONF. Gp-3.

<sup>84</sup> (1) Cable 810, USERR to Secy State, 17 Dec 63. UNCLAS. (2) Cable SHA-5-00271, LIVE OAK to JCS et al., same date. CONF.

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recognition of the G.D.R. which according to the critics was implied, if not inherent, in the agreement.

(U) Nevertheless, on 30 December, Willy Brandt stated that he was ready to resume talks with the East Germans in an effort to extend the arrangement beyond 5 January.<sup>85</sup>

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The New York Times (intl. ed), 31 Dec 63, p. 1. UNCLAS.

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